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JORDAN v. NORTH CAROLINA NATIONAL BANK:
ABROGATION OF AN EMPLOYER'S TITLE VII
OBLIGATION TO ACCOMMODATE HIS
EMPLOYEE'S RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 requires an employer to
make reasonable accommodations to the religious beliefs of both
employees and job applicants, unless he can prove that such accom-
modations would cause undue hardship to the conduct of his busi-
ness. 2 In 1977 the Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison3 reaffirmed the existence of this affirmative duty4 and
partially delineated the employer's ultimate obligations under Title
VII. In another 1977 case, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank6 under-
mined some of the policy bases of the Supreme Court's decision in
Hardison. Applying for a position with the defendant bank, the
plaintiff sought a guarantee that she would not be required to work
on her Sabbath. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the defendant that
the request was unreasonable per se and beyond accommodation. 7
The bank therefore was relieved of its burden of demonstrating
either that it had made a reasonable accommodation or, in the
alternative, that any such adjustment would cause undue hardship.
This Comment will analyze the reasoning and implications of the
holding in Jordan, emphasizing the incongruity of that decision
with the congressional intent and judicial interpretation of Title
VII. It compares the Court's policy espoused in Hardison regarding
the accommodation of religious observances and secular business
practices with the more restrictive position adopted by the Fourth
Circuit in Jordan. This Comment then concludes that the latter
court's misapplication of Hardison in its decision in Jordan led to
an erroneous construction of Title VII.
1. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
2. See id. § 2000e(j), which provides in pertinent part: "The term 'religion' includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demon-
strates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective em-
ployee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business."
3. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
4. Id. at 75.
5. Id. at 79-85.
6. 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
7. Id. at 76.
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TITLE VII AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
EEOC Interpretation and Congressional Intent: Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes employment
practices that discriminate against individuals on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.8 The Act was directed primar-
ily at the elimination of patterns of racial discrimination in employ-
ment,9 but the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency created to administer its terms,10 may prevent
any unlawful employment practices, including those that result in
an unequal treatment of employees because of their religious differ-
ences."
In 1966 the EEOC issued regulations defining the scope of an
employer's duty to eliminate job-related religious discrimination. 2
The guidelines required an employer to accommodate the reasona-
ble religious needs of both employees and job applicants, unless
such accommodation would create serious inconvenience in busi-
ness operations. 3 Although the requirement of reasonable accom-
modation was expected to vary with the circumstances of each situ-
ation, the regulations. mentioned several nondiscriminatory busi-
ness practices that required no accommodation. An employer, for
example, could establish a normal work week that included paid
holidays generally applicable to all employees, even if such a plan
would affect inconsistently the religious preferences of the individ-
,ual employees." Furthermore, the regulations did not require an
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963), reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2393.
10. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
11. Id. § 2000e-5(a).
12. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).
13. The regulations provided in pertinent part:
The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious
grounds includes an obligation on the part of the employer to accommodate the
reasonable religious needs of employees and, in some cases, prospective employ-
ees where such accommodation can be made without serious inconvenience to
the conduct of business.
However, the Commission believes that an employer is free under Title VII
to establish a normal work week (including paid holidays) generally applicable
to all employees, notwithstanding that this schedule may not operate with uni-
formity in its effect upon the religious observances of his employees.
Id.
14. Id. For the pertinent text of the regulation, see note 13 supra.
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employer to adjust his schedule for an employee who had accepted
a position with the knowledge of a conflict between his work times
and his religious observances. 5 In contrast, accommodation was
mandatory if a change in the employer's work schedule precipitated
a conflict, but in making the adjustment, the employer was required
neither to incur serious inconvenience in the conduct of his business
nor to allocate a disproportionate number of unfavorable assign-
ments to other employees.'6
One year later, following inquiries as to whether the discharge of
an employee or the rejection of an applicant whose Sabbath oc-
curred on a scheduled work day constituted religious discrimination
under Title VII, the EEOC issued new guidelines. 7 Substantially
increasing the employer's duty to adapt his business operations to
the employee's or applicant's religious preferences, the 1967 guide-
lines placed on the employer the burden of proving that an accom-
modation would result in undue hardship on the conduct of his
business.' 8 Although the EEOC failed to define undue hardship, it
apparently intended to impose on the employer a greater obligation
of accommodation than had been created by the prior serious incon-
venience standard. Moreover, in accordance with this stricter ap-
proach, the Commission eliminated the examples of non-
discriminatory practices,'" thus suggesting that they were no longer
applicable.
Although the 1967 EEOC regulations purportedly effectuated
Congress' intent, the courts rejected them as the authoritative in-
15. Id. Presumably, an employer's accommodation also was unnecessary if an employee,
although aware of a conflict between another work schedule and his religious observances,
nevertheless requested and received the new assignment. A more ambiguous situation arose
if an employee was converted to a new religious belief during the tenure of his employment.
16. Id.
17. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1
(1976).
18. Id. The guidelines provide in pertinent part:
The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious
grounds. . . includes an obligation on the part of the employer to make reason-
able accommodations to the religious needs of employees and prospective em-
ployees where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business.
• . . Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to
hire an employee or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer
has the burden of proving that an undue hardship renders the required accom-
modations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable.
Id.
19. See notes 13-16 supra & accompanying text.
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terpretation of Title VII. Construing the statute as merely prohibit-
ing discriminatory employment practices, the judiciary declined to
hold that Title VII required reasonable accommodation by an em-
ployer to the religious beliefs of his employees. 0 In a 1972 amend-
ment to Title VII, 21 however, Congress enacted the EEOC's position.
By expressly directing employers to make reasonable accommoda-
tions to employees' or applicants' religious observances, unless such
an adaptation would place an undue hardship on the conduct of the
business, the amendment provided the EEOC with a congressional
mandate to interpret further Title VII requirements.22 This approval
of the EEOC's interpretation, then, suggests a congressional intent
not only to place an affirmative duty of accommodation on the
employer, but also to require him to bear the burden of proving
undue hardship in Title VII litigation.?
Judicial Interpretation of Title VII
Pre-Hardison: Conflicting Standards and Indicia of Compliance
The directive of Title VII is clear: absent proof of undue hardship,
employers must reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs of an
employee or job applicant. Neither the statute nor the EEOC regu-
lation, however, defines the principal concepts. Moreover, although
Title VII's enforcement mechanisms exemplify Congress' intent
that the courts define the Act's terms,4 the amorphousness and
20. See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 519 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1970),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Kettel v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F.
Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ark. 1972). Arguably, an adoption of the EEOC interpretation would
have abrogated congressional intent. The legislative history of Title VII states that
"management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest
extent possible [and] [i]nternal affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be
interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination
practices." [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355, 2516. This limitation, in conjunction
with other statements made during the debates over Title VII, supports the conclusion that
the statute prohibits only intentional discriminatory practices. See, e.g., 110 CONG. Ec.
13079-80 (1964).
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j) (1974). For the text of § 2000e(j), see note 2 supra.
22. See 118 CONG. REc. 7166, 7167 (1972) (statements of Sehators Williams and Javits).
23. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 547 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976) (citing Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d 346, 351
(6th Cir. 1972) and Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1972)); see note
18 supra & accompanying text.
24. The EEOC only has authority to investigate complaints of discrimination and, if rea-
sonable cause is established, to effect settlements through informal methods. 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-5(b) (1974). If these informal settlement methods are unsuccessful, the Commission
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potential breadth of the provisions impede the formulation of pre-
cise definitions operable in all situations. Even the guidance offered
by the exemplary applications of the 1966 regulations no longer is
available.2 Consequently, the judiciary has adopted disparate con-
structions of the extent of the employer's obligation under Title VII
to accommodate the religious practices of his employees."
Despite this judicial disagreement, the case law demonstrates
some consistency in courts' resolutions of particular religious dis-
crimination issues arising under Title VII. For example, an em-
ployee may establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination
by showing that he was discharged or denied employments after
may institute a civil action against the employer. Id. § 2000e-5(f). For the rationale of this
procedure, see [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. &,AD. NEWS 2355, 2515. Furthermore, a finding by
the EEOC that no reasonable cause supports the discrimination complaint does not defeat
the jurisdiction of the federal courts under Title VII. See, e.g., Beverly v. Lone Star Lead
Constr. Co., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971).
25. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1976) with 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966) and notes 13-16 supra
& accompanying text. The EEOC did state, however, that "undue hardship.. . may exist
where the employee's needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially
similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer." 29 C.F.R. §
1605.1(b) (1976). The EEOC left further definition of the concepts to its review of "each case
on an individual basis in an effort to seek an equitable application of these guidelines to the
variety of situations which arise due to varied religious practices of the American people."
32 Fed. Reg. 10299 (1967).
26. The number of district court reversals reveals the confusion created by the statute's
vague concepts. See, e.g., Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D.
Mo. 1974), reu'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Cummins v.
Parker Seal Co., No. 2432 (E.D. Ky., filed March 20, 1974), rev'd, 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 429 U.S.65 (1976); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 369
F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Tenn. 1973), rev'd, 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
964 (1976); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113
(5th Cir. 1972); Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd,
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). For a
discussion of the apparently inconsistent constructions of an employer's Title VII responsibili-
ties adopted by the Sixth Circuit, see 44 FoRDHm L. Rav. 442 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1975);
Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 944 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 5 (D. Ore. 1973); Jackson v. Veri Fresh
Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276, 1277 (E.D. La. 1969).
28. See, e.g., Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975),
rev'd, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977). The majority of religious discrimination cases have con-
cerned employees who were fired as a result of their religious beliefs. In recent years, however,
a series of cases has reached the courts involving employees who have quit jobs with working
conditions that interfered with the practice of their religion. The judiciary has granted relief
in these situations by relying on the concept of "constructive discharge," a principle devel-
oped in unfair labor practice suits arising under § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1970). See Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143-44 (5th
Cir. 1975).
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refusing a work assignment that conflicted with his religious prac-
tices. In such instances, of course, the employee also must demon-
strate the sincerity of his religious convictions" as well as his qualifi-
cations for the particular employment position." If these conditions
are satisfied, however, the burden shifts to the employer to prove
"either that he in fact made a reasonable accommodation, or that
he was unable to accommodate to [the] employee's religious ob-
servances.
31
In addition, the courts generally have agreed that the concept of
reasonable accommodation connotes more than the mere duty to
refrain from intentional discrimination: it suggests a good faith un-
dertaking by the employer of some alternative action to resolve the
conflict between the employee's religious observances and the for-
mer's business schedule.2 The extent of an employer's responsibility
to pursue a solution depends on the facts of each case; each feasible
option must be weighed against the relative burden its implementa-
tion would impose on the conduct of the business. Although the
judiciary has not agreed as to the most appropriate balancing of
these concepts, it has enumerated several factors that a court may
consider in an analysis of whether an employer fulfilled his obliga-
tion of reasonable accommodation. At the very least, the employer
may be required to engage in discussions with the employee, to
obtain advance employee acquiescence in any work schedule
changes, and to agree to an arrangement whereby the affected em-
29. See Hansard v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 5 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 707, 708 (E.D.
Tex. 1973). Two authors have suggested that challenges to the sincerity of an employee's
religious beliefs would be futile. Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role
of Arbitration Under Title VI,, 69 MICH. L. REv. 599, 618 (1971). But see 5 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. at 708.
30. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1975);
Sheffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servo., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937,942 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. '1, 4 (D. Ore. 1973).
31. Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 941 (M.D. Ala.
1974).
32. See, e.g., Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1972); Blakely v. Chrysler
Corp., 407 F. Supp. 1227 (D. Mo. 1975); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp.
877, 889 (W.D. Mo. 1974), reu'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S. 63 (1977);
Sheffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 941 (M.D. Ala. 1974);
Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Ore. 1973); Jackson v. Veri
Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276,1278 (E.D. La. 1969). An employer who merely studies
the problem and concludes that no solution is possible has failed to fulfill his statutory duty
of reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527
F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1976); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.
Ore. 1973).
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ployee himself secures replacements.3 3 In some instances, however,
the employer's obligation may be even more demanding. In Draper
v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. 34 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the discharge of a Sabbatarian constituted
religious discrimination.3 The company had taken several steps to
accommodate the time demands of the employee's religious beliefs:
it had discussed the problem with the employee on several occa-
sions, had allowed the employee excused absences for two months
to facilitate his search for another job, had transferred the employee
to a shift that normally required no Saturday work, and had agreed
to transfer the employee to a production job that, although entailing
a salary reduction and requiring different job skills, included no
Saturday work. Similarly, some courts have required employers to
minimize the employee's economic injury until a permanent solu-
tion is negotiated by making a temporary accommodation.38
The courts also have identified several factors that are relevant
in a determination of whether an employer's adjustment to an em-
ployee's religious practices would cause an undue hardship on the
conduct of the business and, therefore, whether the employer is
relieved of his duty to accommodate. 3 These factors include: the
importance and extent of specialization necessary for the job in
question;3 the number of employees with skills similar to those of
the particular employee;3 9 the size of the employer's establish-
ment;4 0 the economic impact of a transfer on an employee;" the
33. See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
34. 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975).
35. Id. at 519-20. In some situations, the employer may satisfy his obligation by transfer-
ring the employee to a production job. See, e.g., Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F.
Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974).
36. See, e.g., Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Ore. 1973).
37. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(j) (1974); notes 1-2 supra & accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (D. Neb. 1974)
(lack of qualified replacement creates undue hardship).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1976). For the pertinent text of § 1605.1(b), see note 25 supra.
See, e.g., Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S.
63 (1977) (large pool of qualified replacements available but undue hardship caused by cost
of overtime compensation paid replacement personnel); Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist.,
385 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (D. Neb. 1974) (overtime compensation and lack of qualified replace-
ment personnel creates undue hardship and relieves employer of duty to accommodate).
40. See, e.g., Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 40 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd,
432 U.S. 63 (1977) (accommodation caused undue hardship although business was large);
Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Ore. 1973) (size of company
[Vol. 19:590
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effect of the accommodation on other employees' morale;42 and the
existence of a seniority system for the allocation of job assignments
and shift preferences.43 An employer operating a large business
with numerous employees presumably would have difficulty in
persuading a court that he could not reasonably accommodate an
employee's religious beliefs without incurring undue hardship on
the conduct of his business.4 In practice, this employers heavy
burden of proof may be the equivalent of an absolite presumption
that reasonable accommodation is feasible.45
and large work force mandated conclusion that accommodation could be made without undue
hardship).
41. See, e.g., Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975)
(accommodation of employee's religious needs is no violation of overtime allocation provision
when Sabbath observer received no disproportionate overtime allocation); Ward v. Allegheny
Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated per curiam, 560 F.2d 379
(3d Cir. 1977) (because employee was adversely affected economically, a transfer to lower
paying position was not a reasonable accommodation when accommodation could be made
without transfer and without undue hardship).
42. See, e.g., Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.
1975); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 516 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 964 (1976); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 554, 550 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976). The EEOC has stated that undue hardship may
exist if the accommodation would cause " 'chaotic personnel problems'." 516 F.2d at 550
(quoting EEOC Decision No. 72-0606 [1973] CCH EEOC Dec. 6310, at 4555 (1971); EEOC
Decision No. 71-463 [1973] CCH EEOC Dec. 6206, at 4350 (1970)).
43. See, e.g., Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512, 516 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128, 129 (5th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375
F. Supp. 877, 889 (W.D. Mo. 1974), rev'd in part, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 432 U.S.
63 (1977). But see Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975);
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided court,
429 U.S. 65 (1976).
44. See Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Ore. 1973), in which
the court concluded that the telephone company's size and large number of employees re-
quired a finding that accommodation could be made without undue hardship. The company
previously had established a practice of allowing employees to vary their work schedules for
non-religious purposes. Id.
45. See Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 29, who state:
[I]n the absence of "undue hardship"-which is nearly impossible to demon-
strate if the work forCe is large enough - the employer would be guilty of
religious discrimination unless he gave the job applicant a non-Sunday shift,
something to which the applicant would not be entitled but for his religious
beliefs.
Id. at 628.
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Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison: Reasonable
Accommodation and De Minimis Costs
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison" the Supreme Court
suggested the parameters of a definition for religious freedom in a
secular business. Trans World Airlines (TWA) employed the plain-
tiff, Hardison, as a clerk in an airline store that was operated contin-
uously, seven days a week. Although Hardison's religious beliefs
required that he refrain from work on his Sabbath, from sundown
Friday to sundown Saturday, he lacked the seniority necessary to
avoid work assignments during that time.47 The plaintiff attempted
on several occasions to resolve his conflict with the plant manage-
ment and the union steward, but either TWA or the union rejected
all of the alternatives discussed. The union found unacceptable as
a violation of the seniority system a proposal that Hardison's work
assignment be changed. TWA, on the other hand, rejected a sugges-
tion that the employee work a four day week: because the plaintiff's
job was essential to a smooth operation of the business, the substitu-
tion of another employee in that position either would create ineffi-
ciencies in other departments or would mandate the payment of
premium wages. Following his discharge after these unsuccessful
attempts at reconciliation, Hardison brought suit against both the
employer and the union, alleging religious discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII.
Addressing the issue of an employer's obligation to accommodate
an employee whose religious beliefs prohibit him from working on
Saturday, the district court concluded that TWA's accommodation
efforts satisfied the minimum statutory requirements." The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit disagreed, however, stating that
the employer had failed to sustain its burden of proving undue
hardship. 9 The evidence, according to the appellate court, demon-
strated neither that granting the plaintiff a short work week for a
temporary period would hamper company operations nor that
46. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
47. The collective bargaining agreement between TWA and the International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers provides in pertinent part: "The principle of seniority
shall apply in the application of this Agreement in all reductions or increases of force, prefer-
ence of shift assignment, vacation period selection, in bidding for vacancies or new jobs, and
in all promotions, demotions, or transfers involving classifications covered by this Agree-
ment." 432 U.S. at 67 n.1.
48. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
49. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 19:590
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TWA's payment of overtime wages would constitute an undue hard-
ship." Moreover, the court determined that the seniority system
established by the collective bargaining agreement did not relieve
TWA of its statutory obligation to attempt a shift rearrangement."
The Supreme Court's opinion in Hardison partially outlines the
scope of the employer's obligation under Title VII. Contrary to the
Eighth Circuit's decision, the Court concluded that TWA's at-
tempts to reconcile the plaintiff's work schedule with his religious
practices within the confines of the seniority system were sufficient
to meet its statutory responsibility." The company had endeavored
to assign Hardison to a position that permitted a timetable compat-
ible with his religious preferences and had authorized the union to
effect any feasible rescheduling. It also had attempted to secure the
employee another job.
In its rejection of both the plaintiffs and the EEOC's argument
that TWA's duty to make accommodations took precedence over
the collective bargaining agreement, the Court noted that Title VII
specifically authorized the routine application of a seniority system
that was maintained for other than discriminatory purposes.53
Moreover, because the Act prohibited discrimination against major-
ities as well as minorities, Title VII required that an employer nei-
ther deny other employees their shift preferences nor deprive them
of their contractual rights when accommodating the religious needs
of others. 4 To compel a senior employee to replace the plaintiff on
Saturdays, the Court stated, would result in a deprivation of the
former's rights.
The Court also emphasized that an employer need bear no more
than de minimis costs in accommodating the religious practices of
50. Id. at 40-41.
51. Id. at 41-42.
52. 432 U.S. at 77.
53. Id. at 81-82 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(h) (1974) and International Bhd. of Teams-
ters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977)). Section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-2(h) (1974), provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system. . . provided that such differ-
ences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. ...
54. 432 U.S. at 81.
55. Id. at 80-81.
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his employees." The implementation of proposals to replace the
plaintiff on his Sabbath would have involved greater than de
minimis costs, either in the form of higher wages or lost efficiency
in other departments, and thus would have constituted an undue
hardship on TWA. Moreover, in requiring that the company make
additional expenditures merely for the benefit of Hardison, the al-
ternative of replacing the plaintiff on his Sabbath, like the proposed
abandonment of the seniority system, would have resulted in une-
qual treatment of employees on the basis of religion. 5
In Hardison the Court prescribed a fair standard for the evalua-
tion of complaints of religious discrimination. At the very least, the
duty of reasonable accommodation requires an employer to under-
take a good faith effort to resolve conflicts between an employee's
religious practices and his work schedule. The employer should
consider every alternative, rejecting at the outset only those that
would induce undue hardship. If, by creating higher labor costs
or a loss of operational efficiency, a proposal's implementation
would require more than a de minimis expenditure, it may be dis-
carded as unreasonably burdensome. Similarly, an adjustment
produces undue hardship if it deprives other employees of legally
enforceable rights such as those provided by a valid seniority sys-
tem or if it discriminates against other similarly situated workers
solely on the basis of religion. In these situations, absent any
reasonable options, the employer would be relieved of his statutory
duty of accommodation.
The decision in Hardison may eliminate much of the confusion
that has resulted from Title VI's proscription of discriminatory
employment practices on the basis of religion, by establishing an
equilibrium between the competing interests of an employee's reli-
gious freedom and the conduct of a secular business. Unlike several
earlier decisions, which had favored small businesses, 58 the Supreme
Court's balancing approach underscores the importance of a uni-
form application of the statutory requirements. It implies that a
relatively large business, despite having a substantial number of
employees, likewise may experience undue hardship when accom-
modating employees' religious preferences.59
56. Id. at 84.
57. Id. at 84-85.
58. See notes 39-40, 44-45 supra & accompanying text.
59. TWA had conceded that more than 200 of its employees could perform the plaintiff's
job adequately. 527 F.2d at 39.
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Again deviating somewhat from prior case law, in which evidence
of employee dissatisfaction or of disproportionate allocations of un-
favorable work assignments had been insufficient to demonstrate
undue hardship," Hardison prohibits discrimination against any
employee in order to insure the religious freedom of another. The
Court construed Title VII to proscribe all forms of discrimination
and emphasized that an employer must treat all of his work force
equally, thus reaffirming the principle that "similarly situated em-
ployees are not to be treated differently solely because they differ
with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."" Rea-
sonable accommodation, therefore, contemplates only the imple-
mentation of those arrangements that will not infringe on the rights
or preferences of others.
In its definition of undue hardship, the Court in Hardison mini-
mized the Title VII burden imposed on employers. 2 Nevertheless,
it reiterated the principle of affirmative action,"3 thereby requiring
employers to make a good faith attempt at accommodating their
employee's religious practices. Most importantly, the equilibrium
established in Hardison between employers' and employees' com-
peting interests provided lower courts with a framework within
which to evaluate consistently claims of religious discrimination
under Title VII.
60. See, e.g., Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975);
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided court,
429 U.S. 65 (1976).
61. 432 U.S. at 71; accord, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521
F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976); Johnson v. United States Postal
Serv., 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974); Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
62. A requirement that the employer bear more than de minimis costs might have violated
the establishment clause of the first amendment. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. at 93 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Title VII previously has withstood first amend-
ment challenges. See, e.g., Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F.2d
346 (6th Cir. 1972); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Ward v. Allegheny
Ludlum Steel Corp., 397 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated per curiam, 560 F.2d 379
(3d Cir. 1977); Weitkenant v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 381 F. Supp. 1284 (D. Vt. 1974).
Contra, Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
964 (1976); Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Kettel v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Ark.
1972); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971).
63. See 432 U.S. at 75.
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JORDAN V. NORTH CAROLINA NATIONAL BANK: MISAPPLICATION OF
HARDISON AND EMPLOYER COOPERATION
The first Title VII religious discrimination case following
Hardison ignored the balancing approach approved by the Supreme
Court. In Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank64 the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a judgment for plaintiff
Jordan, a Seventh Day Adventist who sought employment with the
defendant bank.65 During her initial job interview, the plaintiff told
the employment manager that she would accept any position requir-
ing no Saturday work. Rather than investigate for potential open-
ings in the bank's various departments, however, the manager sim-
ply told Jordan that no such positions were available. Jordan subse-
quently brought a Title VII suit against the bank, alleging discrimi-
natory employment practices on the basis of religion.66
At trial, the district court concluded that the bank had made no
attempt to accommodate the prospective employee's religious needs
and consequently entered judgment for the plaintiff." The court
found unsupported by the evidence the defendant's contentions that
accommodation would impose undue hardship in the form of im-
paired employee morale and relations.68 To the contrary, another
Seventh Day Adventist employed by the bank testified that the
bank's satisfactory resolution of her refusal to work on Saturdays
had produced no employee discontent. On appeal, the Fourth Cir-
cuit failed to review the plaintiff's evidence of religious discrimina-
tion; instead, it determined that, under the circumstances, reasona-
ble accommodation was impossible.69 Rather than basing its holding
on a finding of undue hardship, however, the court of appeals con-
cluded that Jordan's request for a guarantee that she need not be
required to work on her Sabbath was so unreasonable as to peclude
accommodation."
In addition, the appellate court suggested that the accommoda-
tion of Jordan's request would obligate the bank to provide similar
64. 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977).
65. Id. at 76.
66. Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399 F. Supp. 172, 176 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
67. Id. at 181.
68. Id. at 177.
69. 565 F.2d at 76. The sole case cited by the court in support of its decision in Jordan
was Hardison.
70. Id.
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concessions to all employees and thereby would result in additional
expenses constituting an undue hardship on the conduct of the busi-
ness.7' The court's equation of this hypothetical burden of addi-
tional costs with the more realistic problem of premium wages pre-
sented in Hardison,7 2 however, was inappropriate. Although an
employer occasionally may prove undue hardship without endeavor-
ing to make any adjustments," such proof must have more basis
than mere speculation. 7'
Despite its purported application of Hardison, the Fourth Circuit
in Jordan repudiates both the Supreme Court's reasoning and, per-
haps more importantly, its philosophical underpinning. The deci-
sion in Hardison reaffirmed Title VIr's principal requirement that
an employer affirmatively attempt to accommodate his employee's
religious practices. This obligation is discharged only after an em-
ployer offers sufficient proof that any concessions to an employee or
applicant will impose an unreasonable burden on the conduct of the
business.7 1 Moreover, no presumption of undue hardship arises in
the absence of actual accommodation, and an employer who fails to
make reasonable accommodations to the needs of Sabbatarians
must assume the burden of proving that any accommodation would
cause an undue hardship on the business.
Notwithstanding the district court's determination in Jordan that
the plaintiff had established a prima facie case of religious discrimi-
nation,7" the court of appeals refused to shift the burden of proof to
the defendant, 7  holding instead that Jordan's demand for an exclu-
sion from Saturday work was unreasonable per se. A less adamant
position by the plaintiff, however, would have required a compro-
mise of her religious convictions. Moreover, the court's apparent
71. Id.
72. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
73. See, e.g., Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.
1975).
74. See, e.g., id.; Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Servs., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937,
941-42 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Ore.
1973). Hardison provides some basis for concluding that the mere possibility of future burdens
is sufficient to sustain a determination of undue hardship. The Court stated that "the likeli-
hood [exists] that a company as large as TWA may have many employees whose religious
observances, like Hardison's, prohibit them from working on Saturdays or Sundays." 432 U.S.
at 84 n.15. This dictum, however, cannot be considered independently from the Court's
conclusion that the payment of premium wages to an employee constitutes undue hardship.
75. See notes 2, 23 supra & accompanying text.
76. 399 F. Supp. at 178-79. See notes 27-30 supra & accompanying text.
77. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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requirement that Jordan be prepared to accept such a compromise
during her initial discussion with the employment manager in effect
nullified the bank's statutory obligation to make a reasonable ac-
commodation.
Title VII protects only those employees whose religious observ-
ances can be reasonably accommodated by the employer without
undue hardship. The Fourth Circuit in Jordan, however, articulated
a judicial exception to the statutory requirements: absent the em-
ployee's cooperation, an employer need not attempt to accommo-
date the former's religious observances, although undue hardship
cannot be demonstrated. In relieving the employer of his statutory
obligation before he either has attempted to accommodate the em-
ployee's religious observances or, in the alternative, has proved
undue hardship, this exception will deny employment opportunities
to those individuals who, because they are unable to compromise
their religious convictions, can accept positions of employment only
when the employer will accommodate their beliefs. Further, the
exception will enable employers to neglect the assumption of their
Title VII obligations until they have ascertained whether an em-
ployee will compromise his religious convictions. Because Jordan
provides an incentive for employers to disregard their duty to ac-
commodate the religious preferences of their employees and also
creates an unwarranted hardship on the affected workers, the deci-
sion should not be adopted by the other courts of appeals.
CONCLUSION
Implicit in both the statutory scheme and the judicial interpreta-
tion of Title VII is the notion that a reconciliation between an em-
ployee's religious beliefs and a secular business's practices is desira-
ble. To facilitate this reconciliation, Title VII obligates the em-
ployer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious observ-
ances of prospective and current employees. By relieving the em-
ployer of both his reasonable accommodation duty and his burden
of proving undue hardship in the conduct of the business, the
Fourth Circuit in Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank under-
mines Title VII's underlying policy. The decision places an undue
burden on those individuals with the most genuine religious beliefs,
requiring that they compromise their convictions or jeopardize a
position of employment, whether prospective or actual. Moreover,
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in denying the Act's coverage to those employees and job applicants
most in need of protection, Jordan is inconsistent with both the
congressional intent and the judicial interpretations of Title VII.
